In this paper I present a psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism, the thesis that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state rather than a nonconceptual state. The argument draws on the holistic character of functionalist accounts of mind, together with the "Two Visual Systems Hypothesis" notably defended by Melvyn Goodale and David Milner.
assume that my conclusions so generalize. Whether they do or not will depend partly on empirical matters I won't try to settle in the paper.
Second, I want to emphasize that my argument is restricted to conscious visual experiences. Visual processing very likely involves mental representations at various levels, some of which are subpersonal and unconscious. I take no stand on whether some of the unconscious mental states involved in visual processing are conceptual or nonconceptual states. My claim is only that conscious visual experiences are conceptual.
Third, it is now a familiar point that there are two ways of understanding the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content. 1 On the content view, the distinction holds in the first place between two different types of entities that might serve as intentional contents. For example, perhaps conceptual contents are Fregean Thoughts while nonconceptual contents are sets of centered possible worlds. On this way of understanding things, asking whether a mental state has conceptual or nonconceptual content is equivalent to asking what sort of entity its content is: a Fregean Thought or a set of centered worlds?
On the alternative state view, the distinction holds in the first place between two different types of mental states: those that impose on their subjects a certain requirement for concept possession, and those that impose no such requirement. More specifically:
(CC): An intentional mental state of type Mis a conceptual state just in case there is a requirement that any subject in M must possess concepts sufficient for grasping M's intentional content.
(NCC): An intentional mental state of type M is a nonconceptual state just in case there is no such requirement; that is, just in case a subject can be in M without possessing concepts sufficient for grasping M's intentional content. 2 One might then use the terms "conceptual content" and "nonconceptual content" simply to mark this distinction (and in fact some authors have used the terms this way), without supposing anything about what sorts of entities intentional contents are, and even without supposing that conceptual contents (i.e., the contents of conceptual states) are different sorts of entities than nonconceptual contents (i.e., the contents of nonconceptual states). If the terms are used in this way, asking whether a given mental state has conceptual or nonconceptual content is equivalent to asking whether states of that type impose on their subjects such a requirement for concept possession.
In what follows I adopt the state view, and to avoid confusion I will frame my claims always in terms of whether conscious visual experiences are nonconceptual states, and never in terms of whether they have nonconceptual contents. On my reading of the literature, the state view best captures what most philosophers are really arguing about when they discuss "nonconceptual content". 3 Instead of defending this interpretive 1 See for instance Heck (2000 Heck ( , 2007 , Laurier (2004) , Speaks (2005) and Byrne (2005) . 2 See for instance Cussins (1990) , Bermudez (1998) , Tye (2006) and Bermudez and Cahen (2011) . 3 See Byrne (2005) and Speaks (2005) . To my mind, the crucial point is that many of the central debates regarding nonconceptual content are not settled by assuming any particular view about which entities mental contents are. For instance, even if we follow Stalnaker (1998) by supposing that mental contents in general are sets of possible worlds, many of the debates in question are left unresolved.
claim, however, I simply note that it should be agreed by all parties that adopting the state view allows us to pursue philosophically interesting questions. (The same is true of the content view.) Which types of mental states require concept possession and which don't is a philosophically interesting question. It is this question that I will be pursuing here.
I will be making one non-substantive assumption about concept possession that is worth flagging: I assume that concept possession is required for judgment and belief in the sense specified by (CC); in other words, I assume judgment and belief are conceptual states. To judge or believe that a red triangle is before you, you need to possess concepts including RED and TRIANGLE. 4 Again, this assumption is not meant to be substantive. Rather, the assumption is meant to provide a handle on what concept possession is-as much of a handle as is needed for the argument to come. What is concept possession? It is that which is required for judgment and belief, whatever that is exactly. Determining whether other types of mental states are conceptual or nonconceptual is then equivalent to determining whether those other types of states require that which judgment and belief require. This is a substantive matter.
My argument for conceptualism requires no very specific view of what concept possession consists in, but it may be clarifying to consider such a view here. Provisionally, then, suppose that possessing a concept consists in having certain dispositions, especially (but not exclusively) dispositions to draw rationally apt inferences. Perhaps possessing RED consists in part in being disposed to infer that if something is red then it is colored, and being disposed to infer that if something is green all over then it is not also red all over. And perhaps possessing TRIANGLE consists in part in being disposed to infer that if something is a triangle then it has three sides, and being disposed to infer that if something is a circle then it is not also a triangle.
A philosopher embracing this view of concept possession will maintain that a subject lacking these inferential dispositions is thereby excluded from judging or believing that a red triangle is before her. Excluded because, lacking the required concepts, such a subject does not genuinely understand what it would be for a red triangle to be before her. If this same philosopher wants to hold in addition that conscious visual experience is a conceptual state, she will need to maintain that a subject lacking these inferential dispositions is thereby excluded from having a conscious visual experience representing a red triangle. This is the sort of view I mean to defend, although again I do not commit myself to this particular view of concept possession.
The two visual systems hypothesis
The first premise of my argument against nonconceptualism is the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, as it is developed and defended by Goodale and Milner. 5 The hypothesis, which has received a good deal of philosophical attention, 6 says that human visual processing is carried out by two physically and functionally distinct systems. The first is the dorsal processing stream, which runs from the primary visual cortex to the posterior parietal cortex and provides what Goodale and Milner call "vision for action." It does not give rise to conscious visual experience, but the unconscious intentional states that it does produce play a causal role in controlling highly skilled actions that require fine-tuned visual control and guidance, like reaching and grasping.
The second visual system is based in the ventral processing stream, which runs from the primary visual cortex to the inferotemporal cortex and provides what Goodale and Milner term "vision for perception." It gives rise to conscious visual experiences. 7 These conscious visual experiences do play a role in bringing about action, but they characteristically do so by causing visual judgments and beliefs that involve for instance object identification and categorization; these judgments and beliefs are then deployed in reasoning and planning that result in action. So, the experiences cause judgments and beliefs that cause actions. As Goodale and Milner write, "the ventral stream transforms its inputs into perceptual representations that… enable us to parse the scene, and to think about objects and events in the visual world". 8 In developing their view, Goodale and Milner distinguish between three aspects of performing an action: (1) planning what type of action is required to accomplish a given goal, (2) the pre-movement programming of the parameters necessary to complete the action, and (3) the online control of the movements involved in executing the action. 9 They hold that the ventral stream and the conscious visual experiences it gives rise to are directly responsible for (1) but not for (2) or (3), which instead are under the direct control of the dorsal stream. The sort of planning that occurs in (1) taps into semantic and pragmatic and other forms of information stored in memory, so that an example might involve categorizing a seen object as a coffee cup and deciding to pick it up in order to drink from it. Or, casting the process explicitly in terms of judgments and beliefs: it might involve judging on the basis of one's visual experience that a coffee cup is present and then deciding to act accordingly, given one's prior beliefs and desires. At this point, the dorsal stream takes over, guiding the hand in a way appropriate for picking up the cup and drinking from it.
Turning from what the hypothesis says to the evidence in its favor, the account is supported in part by cases of brain lesions. Goodale and Milner describe a subject, DF, who suffered a ventral stream lesion resulting in an inability to consciously see the shapes, sizes, orientations, or locations of target objects, as revealed by her verbal reports. However, DF is still able to make various precise movements directed at objects, like correctly scaling her grip aperture in order to pick up an object of a given size, and rotating her hand to the correct orientation to place a card through a slot. DF is also able to walk through a test environment scattered with obstacles despite being unable to make even simple judgments about the spatial layout of the environment.
On the other hand, there are subjects with optic ataxia due to damage to the dorsal stream who retain the ability to form accurate visual judgments and beliefs, as evidenced by their verbal reports, but who have an impaired ability to engage in visually directed arm and hand action. For instance, they miss objects that they are reaching for, do a poor job scaling their grip relative to the size of a target object, and rotate their hands to the wrong orientation when placing a card through a slot. 10 For the purpose of my argument the crucial point is that if the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis is correct, our conscious visual experiences do not cause all the effects we naively think they cause. Naively, you likely thought that your conscious visual experience of the mailbox on the street corner played an important and intricate causal role in your successful attempt at dropping your postcards in the mailbox slot this morning. Not so, if Milner and Goodale are right. Your conscious visual experience may have played a role in initially selecting the mailbox as a target, kicking off the practical reasoning process that led to your plan to drop off the postcards, but the finetuned motor behavior involved in successfully placing the postcards in the slot was causally controlled by unconscious visual states from the dorsal processing stream. In short, the set of causal outputs of conscious visual experience is shrunk down from what we otherwise expected, and is confined more or less to the sort of visual judgments and beliefs that figure in reasoning and planning-where again, judgment and belief are by assumption conceptual states in the sense specified by (CC).
Psychofunctionalism and holism
The second premise of my argument for conceptualism is that a psychofunctionalist account of conscious visual experience is correct. In discussing this premise, I will focus especially on the holistic implications of functionalist accounts of mental states, as holism will play a key role in the case for conceptualism.
Functionalists of all sorts hold that mental states are defined by their causal roles, where those roles are specified by some psychological theory. Common sense functionalists take the theory in question to be one that is at least tacitly grasped by all normal adult human beings. It is our collective folk psychology. Psychofunctionalists by contrast take the defining theory to be empirical in nature; they allow that it may include clauses that are at odds with common sense. For instance, a psychofunctionalist could allow that it is a clause of the defining psychological theory that conscious visual experiences cause judgments and beliefs but do not directly causally control action, as the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis says.
I embrace psychofunctionalism about conscious visual experience, but I don't want to devote too much space to defending the position in the present paper-it would distract from my primary line of argument. I must acknowledge, however, that many philosophers reject the view. Some, impressed by the conceivability of zombies or by Mary's room or by yet other considerations, reject any sort of functionalist account of consciousness. 11 Others are functionalists about consciousness, but common sense functionalists rather than psychofunctionalists. In response to such opposition to psychofunctionalism, I have two fallback positions to offer.
First, if need be, my argument could be revised so that its second premise is not psychofunctionalism but the logically weaker claim that being in a state that occupies the right functional role-as specified by our best empirical psychological theory-is required, at least as a matter of natural law, for having a conscious visual experience. This is something that even a dualist like David Chalmers can and would accept, given the "coherence principles" between consciousness and cognition that he proposes. 12 For such a dualist, the idea would be that, say, a conscious visual experience of a red triangle is something "over and above" any functional (or physical) state, but nevertheless it is an experience that subjects (at least in this world, with our laws) can undergo only if they are in the right functional state. I will formulate my argument using the stronger premise of psychofunctionalism rather than this logically weaker claim, in part because I endorse the stronger view and in part because working with it keeps the exposition of my argument cleaner, but I can revert to the weaker premise if I need to.
As a second fallback position, I could revise my argument by changing its conclusion to the conditional claim that if psychofunctionalism and the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis are correct, conceptualism follows. You can find this conditional conclusion interesting and surprising without being a psychofunctionalist. You might have expected that the debate over conceptualism and nonconceptualism would be neutral with respect to various competing metaphysical accounts of conscious visual experience, including psychofunctionalism. Not so, according to my argument. With these two fallback options noted, I won't say anything more to defend my psychofunctionalist premise, but instead will devote the rest of this section to drawing out one of its implications.
Functionalist theories generally have holistic implications because of the way in which they interdefine mental states. The canonical method of deriving functionalist definitions of mental states from psychological theories is due to David Lewis, drawing on work by Frank Ramsey. 13 The first step in the Ramsey-Lewis method is to rewrite the defining psychological theory so that all of its mental terms are names. The various clauses of the theory are then conjoined and each mental term is replaced with an existentially bound variable. The result is called the "Ramsey sentence" of the psychological theory. The Ramsey sentence says that there exist states (of some nature or another) standing in just those causal relations that the psychological theory in question says that mental states stand. By replacing all mental terms with bound variables, the Ramsey sentence can be understood as implicitly defining those terms using purely non-mental expressions.
Illustrating the idea with a toy example, imagine a psychological theory consisting entirely of the following three clauses: (1) Tissue damage causes pain. (2) Pain causes anxiety. (3) Anxiety causes upset stomachs. Here is the theory's Ramsey sentence.
∃x∃y (Tissue damage causes x and x causes y and y causes upset stomachs). The sentence can be understood as implicitly interdefining 'pain' and 'anxiety.' 'Pain' is defined as the state that is caused by tissue damage and causes anxiety, 'anxiety' as the state that is caused by pain and causes upset stomachs. Or, eliminating mental terms altogether: 'pain' is defined as the state x that is caused by tissue damage and causes a state y that is caused by x and causes upset stomachs, while 'anxiety' is defined as the state y that causes upset stomachs and is caused by a state x that causes y and is caused by tissue damage.
One implication of these definitions is that a subject incapable of being in anxiety would thereby be incapable of being in a state that occupies pain's functional role, and so would be incapable of being in pain. Similarly, a subject incapable of pain would be incapable of anxiety. This is the sense in which functionalism is holistic. Drawing further on this holism, an implication of functionalist views is that whenever a given type of mental state M demands something of its subjects, that demand will be "inherited" by any distinct mental state M* that is interdefined with M. Within our toy example, anxiety demands of its subjects that they possess a stomach, since stomachless subjects are incapable of getting upset stomachs, and subjects incapable of getting upset stomachs are incapable of being in a state that occupies anxiety's functional role. But as we just saw, a subject incapable of being in anxiety is incapable of being in pain. Thus, within our toy example, pain too demands of its subjects that they possess stomachs-it inherits this demand on subjects from anxiety.
Perhaps this particular result is implausible. Perhaps we don't really want to hold that you must possess a stomach to be capable of feeling pain. In §5 below, we will see ways to try to block this sort of holistic implication while still operating within a functionalist framework, and we will see how it bears on my argument for conceptualism. For now, the point is that-if we temporarily set aside the complications to be addressed in §5-on functionalist views, mental states inherit the demands on subjects that other, interdefined mental states place on subjects. 14 This point plays a central role in my argument against nonconceptualism.
theory. And suppose in accordance with the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis that this leading empirical psychological theory says that conscious visual experiences cause visual judgments and beliefs that are used in reasoning and planning, but cause little else. Finally, suppose that judgment and belief are conceptual states (a non-substantive assumption).
It follows from these assumptions that a subject who fails to possess concepts entirely is thereby excluded from having conscious visual experiences. For, a subject who fails to possess concepts entirely is thereby incapable of judgment and belief, and a subject incapable of judgment and belief is incapable of being in a state that occupies the defining functional role of conscious visual experience. In this way, conscious visual experience as a mental state type inherits from judgment and belief the requirement that its subjects possess concepts.
This does not yet establish the conceptualist conclusion, for we have not yet said just which concepts the subject of a conscious visual experience must possess. But to support this further step, consider an example. Consider the conscious visual experience of a red triangle before you. From the standpoint of the psychofunctionalist argument, the crucial question to consider is, what are the characteristic causal outputs of visual experiences of this type? Given the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, we know that the causal outputs will not include fine-tuned motor behavior directed at red triangles. Instead, the characteristic output will be the judgment or belief that a red triangle is before you, which can then be used in reasoning to form the plan to, say, pick up the red triangle, where the programming and execution of this action is under the control of the dorsal stream and so not directly caused by the conscious visual experience.
But the judgment or belief that a red triangle is before you require you to possess concepts including RED and TRIANGLE. And these are just the concepts that would suffice to specify the intentional content of your conscious visual experience. Thus, the conscious visual experience of a red triangle before you satisfies (CC), and so qualifies as a conceptual rather than a nonconceptual state. Assuming that this result holds of conscious visual experience generally-there was nothing special about the red triangle example-we are led to the result that conscious visual experience in general is a conceptual rather than nonconceptual state: the conceptualist thesis.
Of course, subjects don't always judge or believe that their conscious visual experiences are accurate. You might have a conscious visual experience of a red triangle without judging or believing that a red triangle is present, because you believe you are the victim of a hallucination, say. But the psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism does not suppose otherwise. All the argument needs is that the characteristic causal output of such a visual experience is such a judgment or belief. If so, a subject who does not possess concepts including RED and TRIANGLE cannot be in a state that occupies the functional role of the conscious visual experience of a red triangle, and the conceptualist conclusion follows.
Here is perhaps a helpful way to think about the argument. Sometimes discussions of conceptualism and nonconceptualism seem to try to focus on something like the intrinsic nature of conscious visual experiences. Yes, the thinking goes, we human beings form judgments and beliefs in response to our conscious visual experiences, and yes these judgments and beliefs require concept possession. But don't get distracted by this. Focus on the conscious visual experience itself, not what it causes. Does the experience itself require concept possession, in the sense specified by (CC)?
The guiding idea of functionalism, however, is that what makes mental states the states they are is not their intrinsic natures, but the causal relations they enter into with other states. What positions do they occupy in a larger network? If what defines conscious visual experience is its various relations with other states, it should seem unsurprising that the demands such experience imposes on its subjects will be grounded in those relations. In that case, attempting to assess the merits of conceptualism by considering conscious visual experience in isolation from its relations to other states, including judgment and belief, is doomed. Better to focus on those relations, and figure out what they entail about the requirements for being the subject of a conscious visual experience. Approaching the matter in this way, we are led to the conceptualist conclusion-or so says the psychofunctionalist argument. I will return to this way of thinking about things below when we consider different lines of argument that have been advanced against conceptualism.
Near-realization and its limits
There is a familiar line of attack on functionalism's holistic implications that bears on the preceding psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism. 15 To develop the attack, set aside conscious visual experience for a moment and consider pain. In human beings, one of pain's characteristic causal outputs is the belief that one is in pain. If, in accordance with functionalism, we take this causal output partly to define pain, it seems to follow that a being incapable of forming such a belief is thereby incapable of being in pain, since such a being is incapable of being in a state that occupies pain's defining functional role.
But, says the objection, this is wildly implausible. Forming beliefs about mental states like pain is a highly sophisticated cognitive achievement that is almost certainly beyond the ken of various lower animals, animals that are nevertheless plausibly capable of being in pain. For example, California sea slugs (Aplysia californica) possess nociceptors and exhibit sensitization and other behavioral responses to noxious stimuli in a way that seems to suggest they are capable of pain, but there is no reason to think that California sea slugs are capable of forming beliefs about mental states. 16 Drawing on this line of attack, a critic of my case for conceptualism might contend that it is a general embarrassment of functionalist views that they place unreasonable demands for cognitive sophistication on the subjects of even comparatively primitive mental states, like pain. What my argument for conceptualism does is simply draw on this unattractive aspect of functionalism. Assuming that we have good reason to resist this sort of implication of functionalist views when it comes to other types of mental states, like pain, the suggestion is that we have good reason to resist the psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism.
Turning to my reply, one possible response to the preceding attack is to reject functionalism. I believe this would be an overreaction though. What I take the upshot of the pain case to be is that we should not demand perfect functional similarity between the different tokens of a given mental type; good enough functional similarity suffices. Lewis captures something like this thought with his notion of near-realization. 17 Drawing on Lewis, we can say that a physical state type P qualifies as a near-realizer of mental state type M-and thus, as a realizer simpliciter of M-just in case P satisfies most (but not all) of the clauses of the Ramsey sentence of the psychological theory used to functionally define M. More precisely, just in case P satisfies the disjunction formed by taking the various conjunctions of most of the clauses (conjuncts) of the Ramsey sentence.
In the case of pain, this would mean that even if the defining psychological theory includes a clause stating that pain causes the belief that one is in pain, there is still room for functionalists to allow that a lower animal incapable of such a belief can nevertheless be in pain, provided that the animal is in a state that otherwise does a good enough job at occupying's pain's functional role. Arguably, this is what we find with California sea slugs. They exhibit many of the same sorts of behavioral responses to noxious stimuli that mammals exhibit: withdrawal of body parts (head, gill, etc.) from the stimuli, defensive maneuvers, recuperative behavior, and so on. 18 On this basis, a functionalist might conclude that there is at least near-realization of pain in this case, and thus that California sea slugs are indeed capable of being in pain. 19 Unfortunately for the nonconceptualist, a similar appeal to near-realization cannot be used to block the psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism. The problem is that if the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis is correct, conscious visual experiences do not have very many characteristic causal outputs aside from the visual judgments and beliefs that get used in reasoning and planning.
To illustrate the point, set aside the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis for a moment and imagine a nonconceptualist arguing as follows. Yes, in human beings, conscious visual experiences characteristically cause visual judgments and beliefs. And yes, lower animals lacking concepts cannot form such judgments and beliefs. But as long as those lower animals can enter into states that otherwise do a good job at occupying the functional role played by our conscious visual experience-meaning, states that cause many of the other sorts of characteristic effects that our conscious visual experiences cause, such as reaching and grasping and other sorts of motor behavior-then those lower animals will be able to undergo the same types of conscious visual experiences 17 Lewis (1970) . 18 Crook and Walters (2011) . 19 Similarly-to take up the toy example used in §3-a functionalist can hold that anxiety's functional role specifies that it causes upset stomachs, and yet still allow that a stomachless being could suffer anxiety (and, in addition, could suffer pain, even given our assumption that pain and anxiety are interdefined), provided that anxiety's functional role is rich enough that such a being can instantiate a near-realizer of anxiety. that we undergo, because they will be in states that are near-realizers (and thus realizers simpliciter) of such experiences.
The problem with such a position, given the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis, is that when you take the causal profile of our conscious visual experiences and subtract away the capacity to cause visual judgments and beliefs, you aren't left with much on the causal output side. This makes it hard to see how any lower animal lacking those concepts we deploy in visual judgment and belief could be in a state that does even a remotely good job at occupying the functional role of our conscious visual experience.
Three other arguments
In this section I aim to clarify elements of my psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism by connecting it to three more familiar arguments that have been advanced for either conceptualism or nonconceptualism. I do not claim that the three arguments to be considered represent the most powerful cases for their respective conclusions. Rather, I focus on these three because they are especially helpful for illuminating features of my view.
The first argument to consider is the cross-species continuity argument for nonconceptualism. 20 I begin my discussion with it because it touches on the issues we were just addressing last section. According to the argument, lower animals can undergo conscious visual experiences of the same type humans undergo even though they fail to possess the concepts we deploy in forming judgments and beliefs based on those experiences. For instance, a lower animal can have a conscious visual experience of a red triangle even if it fails to possess the concepts RED and TRIANGLE.
Two general sorts of conceptualist response to the argument are available. A conceptualist might respond by simply embracing the conclusion that the lower animals in question are incapable of undergoing conscious visual experiences of the type we humans undergo. Notoriously, John McDowell defends such a view. 21 Alternatively, a conceptualist might respond by maintaining that the animals in question possess the required concepts after all, and that their conscious visual experiences are conceptual rather than nonconceptual states.
The position defended in this paper is neutral between these two sorts of response. However, upon observing these responses, we can use the psychofunctionalist argument to pose a dilemma for nonconceptualists who embrace the argument from crossspecies continuity: Just what are the characteristic causal outputs of the supposed conscious visual experiences of the lower animals in question? If the outputs are visual judgments and beliefs, then the animals must possess concepts after all, and again these figure to be concepts sufficient for grasping the intentional contents of their conscious visual experiences. In that case, such animals cannot be used to support nonconceptualism. On the other hand, if the characteristic causal outputs are not visual judgments and beliefs, we then have a powerful reason to deny that the state found in these lower animals is of the same type as our conscious visual experience-namely, it has a very different functional role. In that case, the lower animals in question cannot be used to support the nonconceptualist thesis either.
Of course, simply posing a dilemma does not by itself guarantee that there is no way of resolving that dilemma. Maybe there is room for nonconceptualists to argue that those outputs of the ventral stream that are used in planning action are something less than judgments and beliefs even though they involve (at least something like) object identification and categorization, participate in (at least something like) practical reason, initiate intentional action, and so on. 22 I cannot rule out such a response in advance to considering its details and its empirical support. Still, the dilemma is useful for clarifying a key issue regarding the cross-species continuity argument that might otherwise be overlooked. From the standpoint of the dilemma, the thing to do when evaluating the cross-species continuity argument is not to consider your conscious visual experiences by themselves, in isolation from the visual judgments and beliefs they cause in you, and ask whether lower animals lacking the relevant concepts could have experience of intrinsically the same type, differing only extrinsically in that they don't cause judgments and beliefs. Rather, the thing to do is focus on the causal outputs of your conscious visual experiences, and ask whether lower animals lacking the relevant concepts could share those very outputs (or at least sufficiently many of the outputs for the sake of near-realization). This provides a new way to approach a debate that otherwise might have seemed to be at stalemate.
The next argument to consider is the fineness of grain argument for nonconceptualism. 23 According to the argument, conscious visual experiences represent the world in an extremely fine-grained way that outstrips the concepts we possess, and this means that such experiences have nonconceptual content. To take an example from Michael Tye, consider the maximally determinate shade red 29 . 24 A normal adult human being can have a conscious visual experience that represents a triangle as being red 29 rather than the similar but distinct shades red 28 or red 30 . However, Tye claims, normal adult human beings do not possess fine-grained color concepts like RED 29 , as is shown by the fact that they are unable to re-identify instances of the shade, as would be required to possess the concept. For example, a normal adult cannot go to the paint store and recognize red 29 (as opposed to red 28 or red 30 ) as the determinate shade that her bedroom walls are painted.
Again, two sorts of conceptualist response are worth mentioning. The first, embraced again by McDowell, concedes to nonconceptualists that normal adults do not possess concepts like RED 29 , but insists that they do possess demonstrative concepts, like THAT SHADE, which are just as fine-grained as the contents of their conscious visual experiences. 25 If, say, you stare at your bedroom wall and deploy the demonstrative concept THAT SHADE, your concept will successfully pick out the 22 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me to consider such a view. 23 Versions of the argument are advanced by Evans (1982) , Peacocke (1992) and Tye (2006) among others.
24 Tye (2006) .
25 McDowell (1994: pp. 56-57). determinate shade of your wall-it will pick out red 29 rather than red 28 or red 30 . 26 Alternatively, conceptualists can respond to the fineness of grain argument by rejecting the account of concept possession it assumes and maintaining that normal adult human beings do possess fine-grained concepts after all. So for instance, such a conceptualist would respond to Tye by maintaining that normal adults do in fact possess RED 29 , and denying that the capacity for re-identification that Tye describes is constitutive of possessing the concept. 27 The position defended in this paper is neutral between the two sorts of response. Again though, we can draw upon the psychofunctionalist argument to pose a problem for nonconceptualists. Just what are the characteristic causal outputs of our fine-grained conscious visual experiences? One conceivable answer is that the outputs are finegrained motor behaviors. The Two Visual Systems Hypothesis rules this suggestion out, however. Instead, what fine-grained conscious visual experiences figure to cause are fine-grained visual judgments and beliefs, requiring concepts-either demonstrative or fine-grained concepts like RED 29 -that are sufficient to specify the intentional contents of such experiences. But in that case, such fine-grained experiences cannot be used to support nonconceptualism. A nonconceptualist who rejects this reasoning should say what she takes the functional role of fine-grained visual experiences to be.
Again, don't focus just on your fine-grained conscious visual experience by itself, as a (putatively) intrinsic state, and ask whether you possess all the concepts needed to specify its intentional content. Rather, consider the causal outputs of the experience and ask how those outputs could be used to functionally define such a fine-grained experience-and in particular, ask whether there are enough outputs to define the state without relying on fine-grained visual judgments and beliefs. The Two Visual Systems hypothesis is generally taken to have surprising implications that go against how we naively think of our minds. Maybe one such implication is that we must possess more concepts than some philosophers have otherwise thought.
The final argument to consider is the epistemological argument for conceptualism. According to the argument, conscious visual experience plays the epistemological role of providing epistemic reasons for judgment and belief, and it can play this role only if it is a conceptual rather than a nonconceptual state. 28 As Adina Roskies observes, the most influential arguments advanced for conceptualism have been epistemological arguments along broadly these lines. 29 The psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism is not epistemological. It is not driven by epistemological concerns, and it does not depend on substantive or controversial epistemological premises. Its focus is not the epistemically normative notion of reasons for judgment and belief, but the purely descriptive notion of causes of judgment and belief. I will not attempt to assess the merits of the epistemological argument for conceptualism here. I will simply note that one can endorse the 26 McDowell's demonstrative concept strategy has received extensive critical discussion. See for instance Heck (2000) , Kelly (2001) and Roskies (2010) . 27 See Laurence and Margolis (2012: p. 298 ).
28 Brewer (2005) provides an especially clear statement of this sort of argument. 29 Roskies (2008 : p. 634), citing McDowell (1994 and Brewer (1999) . psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism while rejecting entirely the epistemological argument.
An un-clarkian conclusion
The psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism is inspired in part by a line of thought entertained by Andy Clark in his influential paper, "Visual Experience and Motor Action: Are the Bonds Too Tight?" 30 There are, however, several important differences between Clark's position and my own. In this concluding section I will go over those differences, in the process clarifying what the psychofunctionalist argument contributes to the discussion of conceptualism and nonconceptualism that has not already been said by Clark. First, and most fundamentally, although Clark entertains conceptualism in the preceding passage, he does not ultimately embrace the view, as I do. Indeed, shortly after the passage cited, Clark goes on to insist that the suggested inference to conceptualism is too quick: that conscious visual experience is poised for conceptual thought, that it is concept-ready, does not entail that it is itself a conceptual state, according to Clark, but only that it is set up to cause such a state. For Clark, the moral to draw from the Two Visual Systems hypothesis is that the nonconceptualist must be careful in providing an account of the functional role of such experiences. Clark disapprovingly cites Adrian Cussins, who attempts to spell out such functional roles by appealing to fine-grained motor capacities-this will not work, given the Two Visual Systems Hypothesis. 32 Clark recommends instead the tack taken by Christopher Peacocke, who links conscious visual experience to action via the intermediary stage of spatial reasoning, which "crucially involves the presence of specific demonstrative beliefs and desires". 33 Second, and following on the heels of the previous point, functionalism's holistic implications, which are at the core of my case for conceptualism, play no role in Clark's discussion. On my view, the sort of account of the functional role of conscious 30 Clark (2001) . 31 Clark (2001: p. 514) . 32 Clark (2001: p. 512) , citing Cussins (1990) . 33 Clark (2001: p. 512 ), appealing to Peacocke (1992). visual experience that Clark recommends, and finds in Peacocke's work, has a serious problem. For as we have seen, if the defining outputs of visual experience includes just visual judgments and beliefs, it seems to follow that the experience will require of its subjects that they be capable of judgment and belief, and thus that they possess concepts, and in particular concepts sufficient for grasping the intentional content of the experience. Clark does not consider this threat to nonconceptualism.
Third and finally, Clark was writing at a time before the distinction between the content view and the state view of the distinction between conceptual and nonconceptual content was firmly established ( §1). At some points in his paper Clark seems to be operating with the state view of the distinction that I have been using here. At other points, though, he seems to be operating more with the content view that I have been ignoring. Perhaps, then, Clark and I are simply talking about different things, at least in part, when it comes to the inference to conceptualism.
Again, my claim throughout the paper is that conscious visual experience, as a type of mental state, requires of its subjects that they possess concepts sufficient for grasping its intentional content. In this particular respect, conscious visual experience is just like judgment and belief, I say. This view is compatible with holding that there are other respects in which conscious visual experience is unlike judgment and belief. More specifically, it is compatible with holding, perhaps with Clark, that conscious visual experience represents the world in a different sort of way than judgment and belief do, and in connection that the sorts of entities that are the intentional contents of conscious visual experiences are different than the sorts of entities that are the intentional contents of judgments and beliefs. My psychofunctionalist argument for conceptualism does not directly address what sorts of entities the contents of conscious visual experiences are. 34 In summary, then, although the position defended in this paper resembles Clark's in important ways, the differences between the views are stark. The psychofunctionalist argument against nonconceptualism constitutes a novel contribution to the debate. It provides us with a new reason to be conceptualists.
